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WHAT  HAVE  WE  LEARNED  FROM  CATTLE/BEEF
DISPUTES?
R.M.A.  Loyns, Linda M. Young,  and Colin A.  Carter'
Abuse of important  trade laws represents  one of the most ominous threats
to a liberal international  trading regime.  Joseph Stiglitz,  SEJ,  1997.
BACKGROUND  AND  PURPOSE  OF THE  PAPER
The organizers of this workshop undertook to have reviewed five trade
disputes  among  the  NAFTA partners.  Individual  commodities  were  selected
because of characteristics  unique to that dispute,  their overall  significance  in
trade,  or the nature  of the resolution,  with the goal  of improving  our under-
standing of trade  relations  among  the  three  countries.  The  cattle/beef  sector
was  selected  because  of its economic  importance  in  all  three  countries,  the
example it provides  of interest  group participation,  and because  it involves  a
recent major formal dispute process affecting  each country.
When economists  conduct a case study  review of "disputes"  in a  sec-
tor, and certainly in the cattle/beef sector, the first consideration is to define the
'The authors  acknowledge research/drafting  assistance provided by Kitty Sue Squires
(MSU),  Julia Davis (UC Davis), and the NCBA and CCA for providing documents  for
review.  The  authors also  want to thank Gary  Brester  and John Marsh  (MSU) for the
generous use of several graphs.176  NAFTA  - Report Card on Agriculture
scope of analysis.  "Disputes" that reach formal resolution processes within the
North American  Free  Trade  Area (NAFTA),  the World  Trade  Organization
(WTO) 2 or bilaterally (all discussed in the preceding USDA/AAFC paper) are
obvious candidates  for review.  U.S. investigations  of Canadian or Mexican  live
cattle exports,  initiated by the Ranchers  and Cattlemen Action Legal Founda-
tion (R-CALF), were also that form of dispute3.
However,  there are  other instances of disputes which are more limited
in scope but are no less significant.  They usually involve specific trade consid-
erations that occupy interest group, bureaucratic,  and sometimes political, time
and resources.  These examples  of trade  disagreements  are  often resolved by
negotiation  outside  any formal dispute settlement process,  or they may not be
resolved.  If left unresolved,  they may continue  to stress trading  relations  and
ultimately  may rise in importance  to become  formal disputes.  In  some cases,
informal trade stress may just disappear. In this paper, we identify informal and
formal  disputes in the cattle/beef sector  because  both forms  are  important  to
understanding  trading relations among the United States, Mexico,  and Canada.
R-CALF, and antidumping  duties imposed by Mexico against imports of U.S.
beef in  1999,  are  the only  formal disputes  in beef or  cattle.  In this  paper  we
concentrate on the R-CALF dispute. However, there are several significant ex-
amples of ongoing trade stress in the industry.  We refer to these as  "issues"  in
this paper.  Many of the issues  identified here  have been discussed  by various
authors  and discussants  in previous  workshops  (Hayes and Kerr,  1997; Ander-
son, Mintert,  and Brester,  1998;  Hobbs and Kerr,  1998; Lambert,  1998;  Isman,
1998).
The purpose  of this  paper  is  to review  cattle/beef  disputes  among
NAFTA partners in order to improve understanding of trade stress in the sector,
with the broader goal of achieving  more harmonious trading relations.  The pa-
per will:
'Previously administered under the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
3As discussed in a later section there were three separate actions  launched under U.S.
trade remedy  law by the Ranchers and Cattlemen Legal Action  Fund.
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Figure  1:  Cattle  and  Beef Trade  Issues  and  Incidents.
TRADE  INCIDENTS





Source:  Compilied  by the authors.
TRADE  ISSUES
ELevel of Imports
ilnput subsidies (feed, grazing)
nGrade equivalence
nAnimal  drug  use/testing
EData  availability
ETrade  remedy laws
nSanitary requirements
RESOLUTION
oRecord  of understanding  (Dec. 98)
-animal  drug use/testing; data availablity








nLevel  of imports





Loyns, Young and Carter 177
\  ^.~~~~~~~INAFTA - Report Card  on Agriculture
* identify policy and trade issues among the three NAFTA partners in
the cattle/beef  sector,  and review  causes and consequences  of the
R-CALF dispute;
* provide a summary  of recent quantitative analyses of effects of in-
creased  cattle/beef trade within the NAFTA area;  and
* draw conclusions  on where the current dispute resolution process is
inadequate for achieving  greater harmony among  NAFTA partners.
The next section  of the paper provides an overview of the industry in
the three countries,  and a brief discussion of trade issues and incidents. A simple
model of issues, incidents  and disputes  is provided  in Figure  1.  Section three
provides a brief summary of the U.S. Trade-Remedy  Laws under which the R-
CALF cases were tested.  Section  four describes  the suit initiated by R-CALF
against Mexican and Canadian live cattle imports, and the last section provides
our conclusions.
INDUSTRY  BACKGROUND
Production  and Trade
U.S. beef exports have  grown significantly,  from  1.4 billion dollars in
1989 to 2.5 billion dollars  in 1997 (Figure 2). However,  exports are still a rela-
tively  small  percentage  of production,  accounting  for  8.5  per cent  in  1998
(Marsh,  1999).  The  increase  in exports  has  resulted in the United  States  be-
coming a net exporter, in value terms, of beef since  1994. However, when both
live cattle  and beef are considered together,  the United States remains  a small
net importer.
Increased  imports  of cattle and beef from Canada have  displaced im-
ports of manufacturing  quality  beef from Australia and New Zealand.  In  1999
the  United  States imported  980 thousand head  of cattle  from Canada,  a de-
crease  from  1.3  million head in  1998 (Figure  3). While the  United States is  a
consistent net importer of live cattle from Canada, U.S. exports of live cattle to
Canada increased  to 222 thousand head in 1999 from a previous five year aver-
age of 62 thousand  head, due to increased  demand in Alberta and less onerous
sanitary  restrictions at the U.S.-Canadian  border. One  factor behind increased
U.S. imports of cattle was the cattle cycle, for western Canada had large inven-
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tories that needed to be liquidated (USDA,  1999b). Other factors were the elimi-
nation of Canadian transportation  subsidies  to export grain, resulting  in lower
feed grain prices on the Canadian prairies, and inadequate slaughter capacity in
Alberta.
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Figure  5:  Net Imports from  Canada  and  Mexico,  Cattle and  Beef










1980  1982  1984  1986  1988  1990  1992  1994  1996  1998
Percent  Canada
"-  Percent Mexico
Source:  Marsh 1999.
The United States is also a net importer of beef from Canada, and im-
ports  of boxed beef have  increased fourfold  since  the  implementation  of the
Canada-United  States Free Trade Agreement ten years ago (Figure 4). In  1998,
the United  States imported  823  million pounds  of beef from Canada  and ex-
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ported  261  million  pounds  of beef to  Canada  (USDA,  1999b).  Net  imports
from Canada are illustrated in Figure 5.
The United States became  a net exporter of cattle  and beef to Mexico
in  1996  (Marsh,  1999).  U.S.  imports  of feeder  cattle have  decreased  from a
high of 1.296 million head in 1993  to 959 thousand  head in  1999 (Figure 6).
While the  United  States  exports  some breeding  stock  and  slaughter cattle to
Mexico,  the number is small, with  100 thousand head being exported in  1999.
U.S. exports of beef have increased to 421.6 million pounds in 1998, after reach-
ing a low point in  1995 of 90 million pounds due to the devaluation of the peso
(Figure 7).
Previous research indicates that the U.S. and Canadian cattle and beef
markets  are well integrated (USITC,  1997; Young and Marsh,  1998). Figure 8
illustrates  that slaughter prices in the Nebraska  and Alberta markets  track one
another  closely,  are  separated by  a relatively  constant margin and have com-
mon turning  points.  Inventory  numbers  show U.S.  dominance  in the  North
American cattle and beef industry. On January  1, 1999 the United States cattle
inventory numbered 98.5 million head, Mexico followed with 24.6 million head,
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and  Canada had  12.8 million head  (USDA,  1999a).  Due to  its size,  the U.S.
market is  widely regarded  as the primary pricing point in the North American
market, with regional differences due to transportation costs and exchange rates.
. I
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Cattle/Beef  Sector Issues
With the exception of the cases that are the subject of this paper, trade
and policy relations in the cattle/beef sector have been reasonably harmonious,
and the market has functioned reasonably well.  Aceves Avila and L6pez Lopez
described  the situation well in an earlier workshop paper:
Mexico-U.S.-Canada live cattle-beef trade has  few tariff bar-
riers and seems to be a good example of specialization  based
on competitive advantage of the three countries. (Aceves Avila
and L6pez L6pez,  1998, p. 207).
Working  relations  among  the  three  national  producer organizations4
began prior to signing the NAFTA Agreement. They were strengthened in Janu-
ary 1994 by creation of a tripartite body, the NAFTA Beef Working Group,  an
affiliation of the three  producer  organizations.  The  three  organizations  con-
tinue to meet periodically. A few on-going issues continue to affect trade rela-
tions. These  issues  are  identified  in Figure  1 and  are  discussed very  briefly
below.
Mexico-U.S.  Trade Issues.  For Mexico,  there appear to be two significant
issues in its trading relationship  with the United  States. Much of the beef ex-
ported to Mexico by the United States is offal, low valued cuts and other meats
not usually consumed in the United States.  It is claimed that these meats enter
at low prices which disrupt the Mexican market.  These concerns resulted in a
Mexican dumping action against the United States in 1994-1995, and although
dropped, the concern remains.  In August 1999, Mexico initiated an antidump-
ing suit and levied duties.
According  to Aceves  Avila,  another issue  is  the barrier to  Mexican
exports  to the United  States in the form of a  sanitary  rule  relating  to bovine
tuberculosis  (Aceves Avila,  1998). From the U.S. side, animal diseases and the
volume of imports have been issues. Each of these issues appears to be part of
the producer groups' cooperative  working agenda.
4The organizations are the National Cattlemens' Beef Association (NCBA) in the United
States, the National  Livestock  Producers Federation  (CNG) in Mexico,  and the Cana-
dian Cattlemens' Association  (CCA) in Canada.
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Canada-U.S. Trade Issues.  There are more outstanding issues between the
United States and Canada. Those that continue  to receive attention are grading
procedures (equivalence and reciprocity), animal drug use and testing, and sani-
tary requirements. Consumer safety concerns and access to the European Union
market are  issues  of shared interest.  Border inspections  have  caused discord,
especially when increased vehicle  and animal  health inspections  were used by
several northern tier states to disrupt the movement of agricultural goods enter-
ing from Canada.  Issues involving  import levels and input subsidization were
addressed in the R-CALF actions. Whether the legal decisions emanating from
R-CALF resolved  those issues  remains  to be  seen.  Discussion  comments  by
Lambert  and  Laycraft  on  this paper provide  additional  information  on  these
issues.
For purposes of this paper it can be said that NAFTA, where it applies,
has  contributed  to trade harmony  on many of the "issues" in the  sector.  Some
issues remain but there appears to have been commitment and progress toward
achievement  of improved  trade,  and the market  outcomes  in economic  terms
indicate  considerable  success.  The exception  to this favorable  assessment ap-
pears  to be  events  before,  during  and perhaps  subsequent to the R-CALF ac-
tions.
U.S.  TRADE  REMEDY  LEGISLATION
In November of 1998, R-CALF filed a countervailing duty suit against
live cattle  imports from Canada and antidumping  duty  suits against live cattle
imports from both Canada and Mexico. The R-CALF petitions were filed with
the  Department  of Commerce  under  Sections  701  and 731  of U.S.  trade  law
(Tariff Act of 1930).  Section 701  is intended to provide relief from subsidized
imports through imposition of countervailing duties; Section 731  is intended to
provide relief from product dumped in the United States through imposition of
antidumping  duties.5
'Canada has counterpart legislation  which pre-dates the U.S. laws  in terms of histori-
cal development.  The existing  legislation  is  the  Special  Import Measures  Act  (1984)
administered by the Department  of National Revenue, Customs  and Excise; the Cana-
dian  International  Trade  Tribunal  conducts  investigations  and  determines  injury
(Dutz, 1998).
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The purpose of Section 701  is to provide protection to U.S. producers
from unfair practices  of exporters  resulting  from government  sponsored ben-
efits such as subsidized exports, tax relief and favorable credit terms to export-
ers or buyers.  An interested party can initiate  an action by filing a petition,  as
occurred in the R-CALF case, or the International Trade Administration  (ITA)
of the Department  of Commerce  (DOC) can initiate an action on its own. Peti-
tions  under  section  701  are  the joint responsibility  of the U.S.  International
Trade Commission (USITC) and the ITA. If an ITA investigation under Section
701  determines  that  significant subsidization  exists,  and  if the USITC  deter-
mines that the imports  are likely to injure the U.S.  industry,  a countervailing
duty may be imposed on imports. An important characteristic  of this legislation
is that, once initiated, the process of investigation and decision making is man-
dated and occurs along a specified and tight time line (Coughlin, 1991; Trebilcock
and Howse,  1995).
If the  DOC  in  its preliminary  investigation  finds  subsidization,  the
USITC conducts  a preliminary  assessment  of injury.  If this  determination  is
positive (injury or probable  injury), the ITA establishes requirements  of cash
deposits or bonding equivalent to the estimated subsidy on imports.  If further
DOC investigation  confirms subsidization,  a  countervailing  duty may  be ap-
plied until revoked. At any point in the investigation period which may extend
over 320 days,  findings negative to the allegations may result in termination of
the process and removal of the cash requirements or the countervailing duty.
Section  731  is intended  to  provide protection  against  unfair trading
practices referred to as "dumping." Originally dumping was defined as exporter
price discrimination  which resulted in lower selling prices  in the U.S.  market
than in the exporters' domestic market, or in third markets. Stiglitz (1997) points
out that application of the legislation  has shifted in the past twenty  five years
from the criterion of price  discrimination  to exporters  selling below their full
average costs of production.  Antidumping cases are  also jointly administered
by ITA which  determines  the dumping margin,  and the USITC which  deter-
mines if injury  has occurred.  In order  for an antidumping  duty to be applied,
both a positive margin and material injury must be found. The process of Sec-
tion 731  cases is also firmly mandated but the time frame  may extend to 420
days from initiation.
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Injury determination  is an important  component  of trade remedy  ap-
plication.  "Material Injury"  is defined  as  "harm which is not inconsequential,
immaterial  or unimportant"  and is  assessed  by consideration  of "all  relevant
economic  factors  that bear on  the state  of the industry in the United States."6
Factors  considered by the USITC  in making an injury determination include:
* volume  of imports;
* effects of imports on U.S. prices; and
* effects of imports  on domestic producers.
There  is considerable  economic  literature  on application  of Sections
701  and  731  in trade disputes.  Schmitz,  Firch,  and  Hillman (1981)  analyzed
U.S. antidumping actions against Mexican tomato producers. They demonstrated
the  arbitrary  nature  of the outcome  of the  case  by showing  that  a different,
allowable test (cost of production vs. third market prices) would have produced
opposite  results.  They  also  showed  that it  was  normal  business  practice  for
tomato  growers,  at  times,  to sell below cost of production.  Schmitz et al.  ar-
gued  that the jurisprudence  associated  with Section 731  did  not contemplate
perishable  and cyclical  agricultural  production.
Coughlin, based on a review of Section 701, 731,  and 301 applications,
also  noted major  weaknesses.  He  attributed  actions  as  much to  self-interest
protection  as fair trade motivation and concluded:
Overall, the evidence is that trade-remedy laws hinder rather
than facilitate  free trade.  U.S. fair trade laws can be more
accurately characterized as the bedrock for protectionism
rather than the bedrockforfree trade. As  such, trade remedy
laws need to be remedied  by eliminating the bias toward  pro-
tection of domestic producers. (Coughlin,  1991)
Stiglitz,  writing in the Southern Economic Journal  in  1997,  provided
the  following observations:
6USITC, Live Cattle From Canada, #731-TA-812  (Final). Determination  and Views of
the Commission, November  1999.
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* there has been a dramatic increase in use of trade remedy laws by the
United States in the 1980s and  1990s;
* antidumping  actions  have shifted,  over the past twenty-five  years,
from preventing price discrimination  to actions based  on selling be-
low costs of production;
* in over 80 percent of antidumping case since the mid-1980s, the dump-
ing margin has been determined to be positive, suggesting bias in the tests;
* procedures  applied in countervailing  duty  actions tend to produce
biased margins;
* harassment cases are real,  and legal costs are asymmetric  meaning
that domestic producers have a process-advantage  in the action; and
* the trade laws induce rent seeking behavior.
Stiglitz  also stated  "Since  it is relatively easy to show that a foreign
firm has been subsidized  in  some way, the countervailing  duty laws have be-
come a populist  sibling to antidumping laws"  (Stiglitz,  1997,  p. 412). He con-
cluded that "the laws need to be reformed"  and reported that even the chairman
of USITC admits "we all know that these laws can be improved"  (p. 418).
THE  R-CALF  DISPUTE
The dispute referred to in this paper as the "R-CALF Dispute" was really
comprised of three separate trade remedy actions against Canadian and Mexican
exports  of live cattle to the United  States. An action was brought against Mexico
and Canada for alleged dumping of live cattle under Section 731,  the antidumping
provisions.  The third action was brought against CanadaO under  Section 701,  al-
leging  government  subsidization  of live cattle  exports.  The petitions  were filed
with the Department  of Commerce  in late  1998 by R-CALF,  "a  grassroots non-
profit corporation who's sole purpose is to initiate actions ... [in relation to]  U.S. Trade
Regulations  and Trade Relief Laws" (R-CALF release, undated about July 13,  1998).
The basic  issues behind the action were the depressed state of the calf
and fed beef markets in 1998, and the increasing volume of imported cattle. R-
CALF alleged in 1998 that "beef and live cattle imports have caused an annual
loss in value to U.S. cattlemen of over $200/calf in recent years and an annual
loss to the cattle industry of over $4 billion on a net trade basis" and that "live
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imports  alone  (excluding  beef imports) have  reduced  annual  value of calves
over  $100/head"  (R-CALF release,  1998).  These arguments  were reflected  in
the arguments which led to the USITC investigation  despite considerable  eco-
nomic evidence from several sources, including previous USITC investigations,
which contradicted  this position. 7
The depressed state of the cattle  sector was not, however,  the only is-
sue that influenced the action. It was R-CALF's perception that processors had
the power  to price cattle  in their own interests;  they believed  politicians  were
unreceptive to problems  in agriculture, in particular those of cattle producers;
they had several differences  with the national organization (NCBA);  and they
were suspicious  of accuracy and dependability  of official data on the industry
as  well as  economic  analysis  (Anderson,  Mintert,  and Brester,  1998).  More
generally, U.S. cattle producers were experiencing unfavorable returns and they
were  aware that imports  from  Canada were rising.  Earlier,  producers  had ex-
pressed concerns  about Canadian  safety net programs,  including  the National
Tripartite  Stabilization Program,  that had previously existed in Canada. Those
programs  were  reviewed  by the USITC  in  1993  and were  found  "to  be very
small"  in their  effects.  Despite  that finding,  it is possible  that the perception
remained among  U.S. cattlemen that these programs influence  Canada's  com-
petitiveness.  Safety  nets  and  other  federal  and  provincial  programs  became
part of the Section  701  investigation  on Canadian cattle.
Petition On  Mexican  Cattle
The  antidumping  dispute filed by R-CALF  (November  12,  1998)  on
live cattle  from Mexico alleged damage of about  176 million dollars related to
670 thousand head of imports.  However,  this dispute did not last long. A sur-
vey of U.S. cattle producers before the petition was filed revealed limited sup-
port  for action against Mexico.  NCBA chose  not to support  that petition and
7If the Brester and Marsh results from the appendix are applied to a "750 pound calf,"
an estimate  of the  negative  impact of IMPORTS  ALONE  would  be  about $35/head,
around 6 percent of the value of the animal (Marsh, 2000). If they were applied consid-
ering  ALL U.S.  TRADE,  the impact  would imply an  INCREASE  of about  $6/head.
Holder (USDA, August  1998), Mintert (Kansas State University, August 1998), and the
USITC  (1997)  all reported  that  live cattle  imports  had  very  little to  do with  the  de-
pressed  state of cattle prices.
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Table  1:  Canadian  Cases:  Investigation  Details/Criteria.
Time  Period  Most  recent four quarters  before filing the petition, Octo-
ber 1997 to September 1998.  For subsidization, April 1997
toMarch  1998.
Coverage  *  Live cattle for slaughter;  not beef or beef products.  Ex-
ports sourced from Alberta,  Saskatchewan,  Manitoba,
and  Ontario.
*  For determination of subsidies, 30 government programs
ranging from National Income Stabilization Act, to graz-
ing and  pasture management  programs, to a bear dam-
age compensation  program  in Ontario.  The Canadian
Wheat Board was identified as a source of government
subsidization.
*  For determination  of dumping  margins, six producer/ex
porters with the greatest volume of exports were used to
estimate  production  costs and  returns.
Action Costs  Estimates place R-CALF costs at around  $US  1.7m.  Ca-
nadian direct costs have  been estimated at $ Cdn 5.0 m;
there are noofficial estimates of marketing losses on Ca-
nadian cattle, or estimates of indirect producer group and
government  intervention  costs.
Source:  Various USITC and participant  documents.
actually worked to have it terminated. The USITC preliminary report on injury,
released  about two months  after  the petition  was  filed, found no evidence  of
injury  in relation to Mexican live cattle  imports. The case terminated in Janu-
ary 1999 after the first round of investigation.
The  Countervailing Action On  Canadian  Cattle
There  was  reasonably  broad  support  among  cattle producers  in  the
United States for a countervailing  duty initiative on Canadian live cattle. This
support resulted  in the NCBA taking  a public position of supporting  the peti-
tion drafted by R-CALF. That petition was filed  on November  12,  1998.  No
estimate of damage was provided but the allegation covered  135 thousand head
of imports  valued at 920 million dollars.  The  investigation, begun in Decem-
ber,  covered  28  federal  and provincial  programs  as  well  as  the  Net  Income
Stabilization Account  (NISA)  and the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB). A  few
details of the countervail  case are summarized in Table  1.
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The basic argument in relation to the CWB was that it reduced  prices
to barley producers on the prairies  and thereby represented  an indirect govern-
ment subsidy to Canadian cattle feeders. Most of the evidence in support of this
allegation  was drawn  from published  Canadian  material including  a  submis-
sion by  Canadian cattle  producers  to a public inquiry,  and economic  analysis
conducted  as  part of the ongoing  debate  on role and impacts  on prairie grain
producers of the CWB. As it had in policy debates for some time in Canada, the
CWB  issue dominated  the countervailing  duty  action.  Several  position  state-
ments were presented with claims  and counterclaims about CWB impacts. The
CWB  was a significant participant in presenting the overall  Canadian position
on this case.
Canadian intervention in defense of its position was broadly based and,
of course,  expensive  because these  actions require  using U.S.  legal firms spe-
cializing  in  trade  law.8 The Government  of Canada,  each  of the four named
provincial  governments,  Quebec,  the Canadian  Cattlemens'  Association,  and
the Canadian Wheat Board retained counsel separately  or in combination,  and
made submissions and appearances  throughout the first eight months of 1999.
The preliminary  USITC countervail decision in January,  as is common
in these cases,  found  in favour of injury. That finding initiated further analysis
by  DOC  to determine  the magnitude  of subsidization.  This analysis  showed
that in a few programs there were  subsidies; calculated in terms of the value of
the subsidy to producers  (not the cost of the subsidy to the government),  in ad
valorem terms,  the estimates  ranged  between  0.01  percent  and 0.65  percent.
When these subsidies  were allocated over all production,  the overall level was
determined  to be 0.38  percent.  That  is below  the  1 percent  level required  to
trigger countervailing duty action,  i.e., de minimis, as agreed to in the Uruguay
Round Agreement  (Trebilcock and Howse,  1995,  p.  145). As  a result, on May
4,  1999 DOC  reported that countervailing  duties would not be applied to live
cattle  from Canada.
SStiglitz  (1997)  points  out the imbalance  in influence  and  cost in contesting  a trade
remedy action.  In total, seven Washington legal firms were retained by Canadian defen-
dants.
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The investigation  confirming  the preliminary  analysis continued  into
September,  and when the final ruling was reported October 22,  1999 the esti-
mate  was  raised  to  0.77 percent  (Federal  Register,  October  22,  1999).
Countervailing  duties were not imposed as the level of subsidy calculated was
still de minimis.9 The investigation  agreed  with the conceptual argument that
the operations  of the CWB  could provide  a subsidy.  However,  during the pe-
riod of investigation the estimated subsidies attributed to the CWB were insuf-
ficient for the imposition of countervailing duties. The case was thereby termi-
nated (USITC,  1999).
Antidumping Action Against Canadian  Cattle
The antidumping  petition was  also filed  on November  12,  1998.  The
allegation was that live Canadian cattle were being sold into the United States
for slaughter at "less than fair value," and that imports were injuring  the U.S.
industry. The alleged dumping margin was $6.42 to $10.72 per hundreweight,
on  135  thousand  head. If these two conditions are  determined  to exist,  under
Section 731 of the Tariff Act of 1930, offsetting remedies may be applied. Pro-
ducer support for this action was much less evident than in the countervailing
duty case. As a result, the NCBA took a neutral stance on the antidumping case.
The DOC  and the USITC began their investigations in December,  and
USITC announced  its preliminary  finding of probable  injury  on January  20.
For purposes of this case, fair value was determined to be a "constructed value"
of Canadian cattle based on calculated full costs of production.  Consequently a
major  costs  and returns  analysis  of selected  western  Canadian  cattle feeder
operations  was initiated by the DOC.10 A set of six producer/exporters  were
identified and questionnaires  sent out to provide the basic cost and sales infor-
mation. Four provinces- -Alberta, Saskatchewan,  Manitoba, and Ontario- -were
9Subsidies  are de minimis if they are determined to represent less than one percent of
the value of the product, measured by the amount of benefit conferred to producers.
10There are well defined, standardized procedures  and  DOC regulations for determina-
tion of "fair value"  according to production  costs. Details of the analysis can be found
in DOC, Notice of Final Determination  ..., FR 56739.  October 21,  1999.
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Table  2:  Percentage  Dumping Margins  Posted  By DOC,  June 30 and
October 12,  1999
Weighted Average Percent Margin
Preliminary 6/30  Final 10/12
Exporter/Producer  Effective 7/1  Retroactive 7/8
Cor Van  Raay Ltd. and  4.49  4.53
Butte  Grain Merchants  Ltd.
Groenenboom  Farms  Ltd.  3.9  3.86
Jameson,  Gilroy and  B & L  3.94  5.10
Livestock Ltd.
Pound-Maker Adventures  Ltd.  0.18  (de minimus)  no duty required
Riverside Feeders  Ltd.  and  6.81  5.34
Grandview Feeders  Ltd.
Shaus Land  and Cattle  Co.  5.43  15.69
All  Others  4.73  5.63
Source:  USITC # 3255 November  1999: Live Cattle  From  Canada  (Final)
and  64 FR 56739 October  22,  1999.
identified because  these provinces  are the major source of live cattle for export
to the United States."I
On June  30, DOC  released its preliminary  determination of dumping
margins on live cattle and established the requirement of bonding requirements
on imports effective  July  1. Effective July  22  some margins were revised up-
wards (see Table 2). When a dumping margin is declared, the Customs Service
"Participation  by  Canadians  in the  DOC analysis  is  discretionary  in the  sense  that
candidates can refuse to provide information. One respondent withdrew part way through
the investigation. However,  DOC can conduct its analysis as if respondents  did provide
all information requested.  Hence,  there  is  strong motivation  for those selected  to re-
spond, despite uncompensated reporting costs and contributing  to a process which may
produce unfavorable market consequences. The firm that withdrew from the survey  (on
July  12)  experienced a large increase in its assigned  dumping margin  on July 22.
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requires a cash deposit or posting of bond in the amount of the dumping margin
to allow the product to enter the United States.
On November  19,  1999  the ITC  released  its  final  determination  on
injury  caused by  selling live  cattle  for  export  at "less  than  fair value."  That
determination,  which ended the case,  stated:
...that an industry in  the  United States is not materially
injured or threatened  with injury, and the establishment  of an
industry in the United States is not materially  retarded, by rea-
son of imports from Canada of live cattle, ..., that have been
found by the Department  of Commerce to be sold in the United
States at less than fair value (LTFV).  USITC, Determination
and Views of the Commission. Investigation # 731-TA-812  (Final).
The countervail  case,  as indicated in the previous  section,  was termi-
nated  by the  determination  that  there  was  no significant subsidization. This
determination found dumping but no injury. The distinction  in the findings  is
significant  in symbolic  terms  and perhaps  will  have  implications  for subse-
quent actions.  Exports were  determined  to have been dumped,  i.e.,  live cattle
were unfairly  traded,  and the record  shows that conclusion.  The wording  in a
separate "view of Commissioner Carol T. Crawford" of the final determination
is interesting:
...I find that the domestic industry would not have  increased
its prices or its output and sales,  and therefore  its revenues,
significantly had  the subject imports been fairly traded.  There-
fore, I find that the domestic industry would not have been
materially better  off if the subject imports had  not been dumped.
(USITC, November  1999, p.  32, highlighting by the editor).
The USITC found that Canadian cattle producers traded unfairly, but it
did not matter.  This conclusion, if viewed  from the vantage point of trade har-
mony  and market performance,  speaks volumes.
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Observations  On The  Cases
It is not within the scope of this paper  to analyze positions presented
on both sides of the cases. That would require summarizing hundreds of pages
of documentation.  However,  some key aspects of the investigation  and debate
deserve comment in view of the purpose of this workshop.
First, objective  economic assessment of the Canadian-U.S.  cattle/beef
sector would likely conclude that it is an example of a well functioning, reason-
ably mature market, that has few barriers to trade. Certainly there are pressures
from  the cattle  cycle,  and packer  concentration  continue  to be issues  of con-
cern,  as  are  regulation  effects  on  the Canadian  feed  grain  market.  However,
Canada and the United States have been close to one economic cattle/beef market
for years,  and Mexico is becoming part of that market. Movement toward "free
trade" and its benefits  are as close to reality in the cattle and beef sector as any
other agricultural  sectors characterized by significant domestic production and
trade. Importantly, prices, location of production, distribution of cattle and beef,
and beef consumption are market  determined.
That trade issues persist, and that trade stress arises  within this milieu
is  understandable.  However,  that a dispute could reach  the level  of R-CALF
actions  against Canadian  producers,  generate  the costs and disruptions  it did,
and be characterized  by  an  agency  determination  that cattle  were traded  un-
fairly when in reality they were sold and slaughtered according  to fundamental
market forces,  has  to be a cause  for concern.  It might also be of concern  that
NAFTA mechanisms  for dispute resolution,  and NAFTA itself, did not prevent
this costly  process.  Indeed,  freer trade in cattle  and beef was a major irritant
among R-CALF supporters.
Adding to the concern is the fact that, at the time the USITC investiga-
tion began, there was considerable  economic evidence available  on the role of
imports on  U.S. cattle  and beef prices,  on comparative  levels of subsidization
(OECD,  1999), and on reductions in agricultural subsidies in Canada. The USITC
had conducted its own analyses in 1993 and in 1997 which appear to contradict
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rejecting the petition.12 The national producer organization in the United States
had reservations about addressing overall industry problems through use of the
trade  remedy  legislation,  especially  the  dumping  case.  Certainly  Canadians
would have preferred a different approach.
That these  considerations  did not influence the  U.S.  Department  of
Commerce decision to proceed with R-CALF in November  1998 and again in
January  1999 indicates  that external and  available  economic  evidence  within
the United States  held little  weight in these proceedings.  On the other hand,
incomplete economic  evidence from Canada on barley prices held substantial
weight in the early decisions.1 3 These  considerations  may suggest there were
other motivations for the particular approach.  The cases certainly did draw at-
tention to the issue  caused by the volume  of imports  and created  significant
costs for Canadian producers (and others).  As well, it presented the CWB  as a
trade issue in a new form, and as a new twist on an old issue for Canada.
The  finding  of no  subsidization  by the CWB  turned on the evidence
that during the period of investigation, Alberta and Montana barley prices were
very  similar.  In fact for part of the period reviewed,  Alberta prices  in the un-
usual  situation of exceeding those in Montana. If DOC had chosen a different
time period, the conclusion  on subsidization  by the CWB may  have been re-
versed, and that may have removed the de minimis finding on overall subsidies.
There are  some who argue that historic barley prices have  no relevance  in the
post-Crow  era on the  Canadian  prairies,  and  the  similarity  of Montana  and
Alberta prices will prevail  in the future.  Whether Canadian barley  prices will
arbitrage well with those in the United States depends partly on how much the
border  is opened  to grain  movements.  These  comments  illustrate  the  cross-
sector relationships  that exist, and raise the issue of harmony between  Canada
and the United States on cross-border grain trade. Had Canadian prairie barley
marketing continued under the open-border framework introduced in 1993 (the
continental  barley market), the 701 action might not have occurred.
'2The final USITC determination indicating lack of injury more or less replicated these
findings.
'3Initial allegations of CWB barley price and feed cost differences  were grossly  over-
stated and based upon arguments that were inappropriate  to the case.
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There  are numerous criticisms of the cost of production  methodology
used in these  investigations  to determine  dumping margins  (Coughlin,  1991).
One concern is that there are legitimate instances  when agricultural and manu-
facturing companies  sell below  their cost of production.  As quoted by Bovard
"If the  same antidumping  laws applied to U.S.  companies,  every  after-Christ-
mas  sale in the  United  States  would be  banned"  (Coughlin,  1991,  p.  13).The
cyclical  nature  of prices  in the cattle  industry  (illustrated in Figure  8)  is well
known. Many  U.S.  producers  sold  cattle  during the period of investigation  at
market prices that were below the cost of production, and some U.S. producers
stated misgivings  at the double  standard applied in this case.
There  are  other problems  in  using cost  of production  for  these  pur-
poses.  The method of determining the dumping margin is to exclude  "below-
cost sales" in the home market (Canada)  from the comparison  if the proportion
of below-cost sales exceeds  20 percent. These below-cost sales, consistent with
legal  requirements,  were  excluded  from  determination  of normal value.  This
means  that the distribution of sales prices in Canada was  truncated,  but there
was no corresponding  adjustment  made in U.S.  prices. This means that differ-
ent (in fact,  biased)  price estimates  are  used between  Canada  and the United
States  to determine  the  antidumping  margin.  Further,  there is  no indication
that tests  are  conducted  to  determine  if differences  in prices  are  statistically
significant.  These procedural matters cast doubt on the validity of the calcula-
tions.
Finally,  there is  an efficient  and accurate  way  to identify differential
input costs (subsidized or market determined)  facing livestock  producers.  It is
to analyze regional  (in this case,  cross-border)  prices and flows of feeder  ani-
mals.  Subsidized feed costs in Canada would show up as higher feeder animal
prices and/or inflows, just as support for grains and subsidized farm credit show
up in  land prices.  This  economic  test  could be conducted  relatively  easily by
either side  to the argument. It would likely show  that, as in feeder cattle  from
Mexico and feeder pigs from western Canada, the flow of feeder cattle was for
some time to the United States.  Health restrictions on imports into Canada do
not explain  southern movements  of Canadian feeder  cattle  and pigs,  but rela-
tive feeding costs probably do.
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Table 3:Mexican Antidumping Duties on Selected  U.S.  Beef Products, 1999
Item  Shipper  Duty
(percent)
Live  Cattle  all  none
Beef Carcasses  ConAgra,  Excel Corp.,  IBP  none
other shippers  5.24
Bone-In Beef Cuts  ConAgra,  Excel Corp.,  IBP  none
Farmland  National Beef Co.  7.60
other shippers  12.76
Boneless  Beef Cuts  Excel Corp.,  Farmland  none
National Beef  Co.
IBP  4.14
ConAgra  7.66
other shippers  74.98
Source:  USDA  1999c.
The use of trade remedy  law is costly in unanticipated  ways.  This  is
illustrated by the Government of Mexico  antidumping suit against the export-
ers of U.S. cattle, beef and edible beef offals in  1999. Mexico's  Secretariate of
Commerce  and Industrial  Development  found that  some  U.S.  exporters  sold
selected beef products to Mexico  at prices determined to constitute  dumping.
Antidumping  duties  were  implemented  on August  2,  1999  (USDA,  1999c).
Table  3 shows  the  duties  imposed  for selected  products,  which  vary  by the
company selling  the product.  The  actions  by the  Government  of Mexico  are
regarded by some observers to be in retaliation for U.S. trade actions, and illus-
trates how trade relations can degenerate in unanticipated  and costly ways.
These observations  indicate  that  there  remains  much  to be  done  in
achieving trade harmony in what is already a relatively free market and which,
otherwise,  should be  a relatively  dispute free  sector.  They  also indicate  that
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Table  4:  A Binary Assessment  of Economic  Impacts  of R-CALF
United States  Canada
C.V  A.D.  C.V.  A.D.
Imports  0  0  0  0
Producer price  impact  0  0
Packer impacts  - - +  +
Consumer  price impact  0  0  +  +
Dispute costs
Producer group relations
Short-run  trade  relations
Long-run  harmony  ?  ?  ?  ?
Notes:  + indicates probable favourable outcome  in  relation to the factor.
- indicates probable unfavourable outcome.
0  indicates no perceptible impact.
Source:  Compiled  by the authors.
responsibility  for achieving trade harmony  lies with each  of the NAFTA part-
ners.
CONCLUSIONS
Table  4  summarizes  some  of the probable  impacts  and  direction  of
benefit or loss from the R-CALF experience.  It is not an encouraging picture. If
our conclusions  on impacts are  valid, the most likely  "winners"  are Canadian
packers and, perhaps, Canadian consumers. That was not the intended outcome
of the action.  It is  difficult to  identify  any  significant benefits  to  offset  the
considerable  costs incurred  by  the parties  to the R-CALF dispute,  and Cana-
dian producers  bore market costs of the antidumping  margin through reduced
prices.
Ideas  of how  to develop  dispute resolution  systems  that will  achieve
greater harmony across the U.S., Mexican and Canadian beef industries can be
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informed  by  an  evaluation  of the experiences  in  the R-CALF  cases.  On the
positive  side, the processes  used by the DOC and the USITC resulted in nega-
tive final findings for both suits. The  antidumping duty was terminated and a
countervailing  duty  was never  imposed.  The investigations  published  by the
USITC and the DOC follow previous USITC reports (in  1987,  1993 and 1997)
that did not find violations of trade agreements  or anticompetitive practices  by
the Canadian cattle industry. Another positive aspect of these investigations  is
that they  directly  responded  to concerns  raised by the  U.S.  industry,  for ex-
ample, the impact of CWB practices  on feed prices in Canada. In doing so, the
investigations  have  added information  and data  on the Canadian and U.S.  in-
dustries.
There  are also negative consequences  of this application of U. S. (and
Mexican)  trade remedy law. Antidumping and countervailing  duty actions are
costly. The industries in both countries must invest a large amount of resources
in preparing their case. Reportedly,  the U.S. industry spent US$1.7 million and
the Canadian  industry  spent  CA$5  million in legal  and associated  fees.  The
opportunity  costs  of this time and money,  and the unaccounted costs,  for  the
industry are high as the resources  could  have been directed  at trade issues  of
joint concern, such as the European Union beef hormone dispute, or the reduc-
tion of other trade barriers  through multilateral negotiations  in the WTO.  Sub-
stantial  resources,  which also have high opportunity costs, were expended  by
both governments.  In addition,  a linkage may exist between  the R-CALF suits
and the suit initiated by the Government  of Mexico  against the U.S.  industry,
increasing  the cost  of the R-CALF  suits.  Importantly,  progress  on  efforts  to
make changes to ease other trade issues (as in Figure 1) often stall during peri-
ods of high conflict. There may  be a question  of willingness  to  pursue other
issues after this conflict.
Certainly economic losses were imposed on the Canadian industry even
though  the bond  funds  are returned.  Brester,  Marsh,  and Smith (1999,  p.  24)
estimate that with imposition of the antidumping tariff of 5.57 per cent, Cana-
dian slaughter prices were reduced by 2.88 per cent in the short run (US$  1.77/
cwt)  or by 3.53  per cent in the long run if they had been in place  longer (US$
2.17/cwt). That represents  a large price decline over the July-November  mar-
keting  period and significant revenue reduction. Economic  losses would have
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been much  larger had the  final  determination been positive  for R-CALF,  and
antidumping  duties implemented for an extended period.  This raises the ques-
tion of liability for market and defense costs in disputes of this nature- -should
initiating  parties  have  some  financial responsibility  if their  case  fails? Legal
settlements often ignore  economic costs, but compensation payments are com-
mon in agricultural policy.
The  antidumping  and  countervailing  duty  processes  under  the  Tariff
Act  were not  designed  to encourage  and  develop  good  working relations  be-
tween  two  industries  or to accommodate  partners  in  a  trade  agreement.  The
process  was  designed  in  a  era when  domestic  production  was  dominant,  to
provide protection to domestic industry under pressure from imports. However
this has all changed with globalization.  More importantly, NAFTA is a trinational
agreement and the cattle/beef sector is approaching  one market. The trade rem-
edy process is a legal-administrative  process which encourages  adversarial be-
havior.  In  the  quest  for  improved trade  harmony  and reduced  policy  stress,
particularly  in  the face  of economic  evidence pointing  so  strongly  to  "very
small  impacts,"  a less  damaging process needs  to be developed.  As  indicated
earlier,  there is economic  literature  which supports  that position,  and this re-
view of the  R-CALF actions reaches  that conclusion.
Avoidance of trade disputes may be facilitated by greater involvement
of producers  and other industry participants in problem solving. There has been
discussion of the potential of cross border producer organization in past work-
shops. The past year has produced  several  examples of cross-border  meetings
and conferences,  some of which are discussed  later in this publication.  These
fora are to be encouraged. Further, within NAFTA there are provisions for dealing
with  sanitary and phytosanitary issues  according  to "science based"  evidence
and rules. Adherence  to "economic science-based" information early in the R-
CALF discussions may have avoided the entire process. Building an "economic-
science based" analogue into NAFTA process may be a useful consideration.
Trade remedy law in its present  form, needs  to be, at most, "last resort" action.
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APPENDICES
Two  recent  analyses  of the  cattle/beef  sectors  in  the  United  States,
Mexico,  and  Canada provide  useful economic  information  related  to  the  R-
CALF case,  and to the overall question of effects  of NAFTA on cattle and beef
trade. They are  briefly summarized here as information  related to the purpose
of this workshop.
APPENDIX  1
USITC  Analysis of Quantitative Relationships Among
Mexican,  Canadian,  and  United  States  Cattle  and  Beef Industries
The USITC report set out to analyze the impact of NAFTA  and URA
on U.S.  imports  and exports of live cattle  for  slaughter (LCFS), and on  fresh
and frozen beef;  and to report on  steps to prevent transshipment  of fresh  and
frozen beef through Mexico and Canada to the United States. Chapter 4 of the
report IMPACT OF THE NAFTA ON U.S.  TRADE IN CATTLE FOR SLAUGH-
TER AND  BEEF contains  results  of quantitative  analysis using  econometric
models  of factors  which,  for  Canada,  appear  to be directly  related to  issues
raised in the R-CALF petitions. The evidence on Mexico is relevant only to the
question of NAFTA effects  on the  sector.
For Mexico,  the  analysis  demonstrated  that the new  zero level  tariff
rates on cattle and beef within NAFTA resulted in the United States becoming
the  virtual sole supplier of Mexican beef imports. The USITC estimates  show
an  increase in U.S. exports of 187m pounds, valued  at $180M over the period
1994-'96, with the United States now accounting for about 97 percent of Mexi-
can imports.  Canada has no significant cattle/beef trade with Mexico except in
breeding stock. Second, the analysis indicated that peso devaluation had a larger
net effect on U.S. exports  to Mexico  than NAFTA,  and in the opposite direc-
tion. The estimates are about 314 m pounds reduction,  valued at about $300m.
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The peso devaluation was composed of two separate,  and opposite effects. Ed-
ible offal and other by-products (for retail or household consumption)  declined
significantly.  Imports for the HRI trade increased due to increased tourism.
The analysis of imports from Canada showed:
* Canadian live cattle for slaughter imports  are determined by prices
on both sides of the border. The elasticity of trade with respect to
price U.S. and Canadian prices is 3.7. (in other words arbitrage in the
LCS market functions  as economists  would expect);
* cattle inventories can be used to predict future LCFS imports;
* available slaughter plant capacity on the Canadian prairies influenced
LCFS imports  in the post-NAFTA  era;
* there was no indication of major NAFTA impacts on LCFS imports
from Canada because tariff levels were already low (less than 2 per-
cent ad valorem) prior to implementation of NAFTA meaning that
the structural  change associated  with NAFTA was small;
* "grain prices were found not to be important in explaining the pat-
tern of trade over the past few years." (p. 4-32);  and
* during 1997 and into  1998,  there should be a decline  in Canadian
LCFS resulting from reduced Canadian cattle  inventories and in-
creased  slaughter capacity  coming on line in Alberta.
The report concluded:
While increased slaughter  capacity in Canada will likely re-
sult in  fewer live cattle for slaughter  moving south, it may also
provide opportunities  for increased shipments of feeder and
slaughter cattle to Canada. If so,  then Canada will increas-
ingly export beef rather  than live cattle for slaughter,  particu-
larly if efforts to harmonize the meat-grading system of both
countries are successful .(USITC,  1999,  p. 4-32).
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APPENDIX  2
U.S. Beef and Cattle Imports and  Exports: Impacts on Cattle Prices
Brester and Marsh (1999)  report:
* U.S. cattle and beef imports from Canada increased substantially after
1988, increasing Canada's share of total beef imports (which increased
only  slightly over the same period);
* U.S. prices declined steadily  in the 1990s; of the $8/cwt decline in
slaughter prices,  4.4 percent of the reduction,  or $0.35/cwt was at-
tributable to the change in Canadian cattle and beef imports;
* cattle prices continued to fall in 1998  as a consequence  of increased
marketing weights, large supplies  of competing meats, flat exports,
and Asian flu problems;  the contribution from imports from Canada
was  small;
* imports from Canada represented  6.5 percent of total U.S. beef sup-
plies in 1998;
* U.S. beef exports to Canada (1989-1997) increased  by less than half
a percent;
* the United States  is a net importer of beef,  veal, and live animals
when  imports are measured  in volume  (carcass equivalents)  terms.
When imports are measured in value terms, the United States is a net
exporter;  and
* using their model to extrapolate  different U.S. trade scenarios,  indi-
cates that the finished cattle price in the United States would rise by
about $5/cwt if all imports of cattle and beef from Canada and Mexico
were eliminated, but fall by $5/cwt. if all U.S. participation in cattle/
beef trade were eliminated.  Eliminating  all other beef imports are
estimated to raise U.S. price by $1/cwt.; eliminating  U.S. exports
reduces price by about $11.00/cwt,  more than half of which is asso-
ciated with by-product exports.
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APPENDIX  3
Chronology of Petitions on Canadian  Live Exports
Section  701: Countervailing  Duty Action Against Canada
* October  1998:  NCBA supports  initiatives on cvd against live cattle
from Canada.
* November  12,  1998: Petition filed by R-CALF.
* December 22,  1998:  DOC initiates investigation.
* January 20,  1999: USITC (preliminary) finds reasonable grounds for
injury.
* May 4, 1999: DOC (preliminary), Canadian Subsidy rate determined
to be 0.38 percent (de minimis). No duty imposed.
* October 22,  1999: DOC final report/countervailable  subsidies  are
not being provided to producers or exporters of live cattle in Canada.
Case terminated.
Section  731: AntiDumping Action Against Canada
* October  1998:  NCBA takes  a neutral  position on antidumping  case
against Canadian live cattle imports.
* November  12,  1998:  R-CALF petition filed.
* December 22,  1998: DOC initiates investigation.
* January 20,  1999: USITC (preliminary)  finding of grounds for in-
jury.
* March  1, 1999:  six Canadian  cattle feeder/exporter  respondents  se-
lected for analysis of production  costs.
* March-May  1999:  responses  on costs.
* June 30, 1999: dumping margins determined; requirements for bond-
ing exports imposed effective  July 1.
* July  23,  1999:  revised dumping margins (upward  adjustment).
* October 21,  1999:  margins revised effective July  8.
* November  19,  1999:  ITC Final Determination of No Injury.
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